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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 This case involves the federal crimes of honest 
services fraud, mail fraud, and bribery.  Appellants Wayne 
Bryant and R. Michael Gallagher were charged with six 
counts of honest services fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1341, 1343 and 1346 (the “honest services fraud counts”), 
and one count each of bribery in connection with a state 
agency that receives federal funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666(a) (the “bribery counts”), all in connection with a 
scheme to defraud the citizens of the State of New Jersey of 
Bryant’s honest services as a State Senator.  Counts 9-13 
charged Bryant with mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341, in connection with a second scheme involving his 
state pension application.  A jury convicted Bryant on all 
counts and Gallagher on all counts but one, which dealt with 
the mailing of Bryant’s 2003 Financial Disclosure statement.  
Their sentences included imprisonment—48 months for 
Bryant and 18 months for Gallagher—and joint restitution in 
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the amount of $113,167.  For the reasons that follow, we 
affirm their convictions and the restitution order. 
I. Background 
 Gallagher was formerly Dean of the School of 
Osteopathic Medicine (“SOM”) of the University of Medicine 
and Dentistry of New Jersey (“UMDNJ”).  Bryant, as noted, 
was a New Jersey State Senator.  They were indicted in 2007.  
The charges stemmed from an alleged quid pro quo 
arrangement in which Gallagher gave Bryant a “low-show” 
job at SOM (meaning he provided only minimal or nominal 
services) as a “Program Support Coordinator,” in which 
position he received an annual salary of $35,000 (and a 
$5,000 bonus), in exchange for Bryant’s efforts as Chairman 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee to funnel State 
funding to SOM.  The quo was a “success”:  during Bryant’s 
tenure at SOM, the institution gained an additional $10 
million in funding over three years.  Based on that same 
scheme, Bryant and Gallagher were also charged under the 
federal bribery statute—Bryant for corruptly soliciting and 
demanding the SOM salary and Gallagher for corruptly 
giving the salary.   
 In a second scheme, involving only Bryant, the 
Government alleged that he also attempted to use a “no-
show” job (meaning he personally provided no services at all) 
as an attorney for the Gloucester County Board of Social 
Services (the “Social Services Board”) to increase his pension 
benefits.  Specifically, the Government introduced evidence 
at trial showing that Bryant falsely reported that he had 
worked numerous hours providing legal services to the Social 
Services Board when he had not provided those services at all 
but had delegated his work to associates at his private law 
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firm.  In other words, Bryant claimed pensionable time credit 
for work he did not do.  In New Jersey, the amount of pension 
benefits for which a public servant is eligible depends on the 
number of public sector jobs held.  Thus, by accumulating 
public sector jobs, but not actually performing the duties 
commensurate with the positions, the Government argued that 
Bryant fraudulently inflated his pension eligibility.     
 After Appellants’ convictions in November 2008, the 
District Court denied their motions for a judgment of acquittal 
or a new trial and this appeal followed.  The District Court 
had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Appellants challenge their convictions on the 
following grounds:  they argue that the Government violated 
their due process rights by interfering with their access to 
potential witnesses in the pretrial phase of the case; that the 
evidence of honest services fraud and bribery was 
insufficient; and that the jury instructions on both honest 
services fraud and bribery were defective.  Bryant challenges 
the sufficiency of the evidence that he committed mail fraud 
in connection with the pension scheme.  He also claims that 
he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal or a new trial on the 
pension fraud counts because the District Court improperly 
allowed a lay witness to testify about the law.  Lastly, both 
Bryant and Gallagher challenge the order of restitution.  We 
consider each argument in turn. 
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II. Discussion 
A. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim 
 During its investigation of Appellants, the Government 
issued grand jury subpoenas to potential witnesses with the 
following language placed on the front of each subpoena: 
Disclosure of the nature and existence of this 
subpoena could obstruct and impede a criminal 
investigation into alleged violations of federal 
law.  Therefore, the United States Attorney 
requests that you do not disclose the existence 
of this subpoena. 
Appellants argued to the District Court that this language, and 
the Government’s requests during the grand jury proceedings 
that witnesses voluntarily not disclose “any matters” that 
occur during those proceedings,1 interfered with the defense’s 
access to witnesses.  They claim that this violated due process 
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)(A),2
                                              
1 Appellants allege two additional examples of improper 
Government conduct:  that an FBI agent told a witness not to 
disclose the subpoena, or “words to [that] effect;” and that 
another agent asked a witness after her testimony whether she 
had heeded the nondisclosure request.     
 which 
 
2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)(A) states, in 
part, that “[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any 
person except in accordance with [the exceptions enumerated 
in B].”  Those exceptions are laid out in Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)(B), which lists certain actors in 
the grand jury process who “must not disclose a matter 
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prohibits the Government from imposing an obligation of 
secrecy on witnesses.  The District Court denied their pretrial 
motion to dismiss the indictment on those grounds.  Instead, it 
ordered the Government to write to the witnesses and inform 
them that they were under no legal obligation to keep the 
subpoena secret.   
 On appeal, Appellants again argue that the 
Government’s conduct—including both the subpoena 
language and its requests to witnesses to preserve the secrecy 
of the proceeding—violated Rule 6(e)(2)(A) and due process.  
They claim that the Government’s actions restricted the “free 
choice” of potential witnesses to speak to defense counsel and 
effectively imposed an obligation of secrecy on those 
witnesses.  We disagree.   
 We review a district court’s decision regarding a 
motion to dismiss an indictment because of prosecutorial 
misconduct for abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Lee, 
612 F.3d 170, 193 (3d Cir. 2010).  Generally, because 
witnesses “belong” neither to the defense nor to the 
prosecution, both must have equal access to witnesses before 
trial.  Kines v. Butterworth, 669 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1981); 
Callahan v. United States, 371 F.2d 658, 660 (9th Cir. 1967).  
If the prosecution impermissibly interferes with the defense’s 
access to a witness during a criminal trial, that conduct 
violates due process insofar as it undermines the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding.  Kines, 669 F.2d at 9 (collecting 
cases).  In connection with a grand jury proceeding, Rule 
6(e)(2) also provides that the Government may not impose an 
                                                                                                     
occurring before the grand jury.”  Witnesses are not included 
in that listing. 
8 
 
obligation of secrecy on a witness absent limited exceptions, 
none of which applies here.    
 However, there is an important difference between 
requesting nondisclosure and discretion on the part of 
witnesses and artificially restricting defense counsel’s access 
to witnesses by, for example, instructing the latter not to 
communicate with the former.  Merely requesting that 
witnesses practice discretion does not violate a defendant’s 
due process rights.  See United States v. Agostino, 132 F.3d 
1183, 1191-92 (7th Cir. 1997).  Here, the record demonstrates 
that the Government requested, but never required, witnesses 
not to disclose the subpoena or the grand jury proceedings.  
Aside from those requests, it took no affirmative steps to 
restrict or stop witnesses from conferring with the defense.   
 Appellants argue that the language, emblazoned on the 
subpoena, gave an appearance of a judicial imprimatur that 
suggested to witnesses they were legally obligated to comply 
with the Government’s secrecy request.  Certainly, many 
forthright citizens would comply with such a request, given 
the context in which it was made.  However, we will not say 
what occurred here imposed an obligation of secrecy.  
Compare id. at 1192 (holding that prosecutor’s mere request 
that witness not discuss his testimony with defense counsel, 
while acknowledging his right to do so, did not constitute a 
due process violation), with In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Appeal of Diamante), 814 F.2d 61, 68-70 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(concluding that a subpoena instructing witnesses “not to 
disclose the existence of this subpoena or the fact of your 
compliance for a period of 90 days from the date of the 
subpoena” impermissibly conveyed that witnesses were 
legally obligated to remain silent).         
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 Nor do we think that the Government’s actions 
infected the fairness of the proceeding.  Notably, Appellants 
did not identify to the District Court (nor do they now) any 
witnesses who claim that they would have spoken to the 
defense but were deterred from doing so because of the 
Government’s nondisclosure requests.  Rather, those 
witnesses who declined to speak with the defense did so on 
the advice of counsel.3
 Even if there were witnesses (about whom we do not 
know) with the mistaken impression that they could not speak 
to the defense, the District Court took measures to clarify 
such a misunderstanding well before trial.  In response to 
Appellants’ motion to dismiss, the Court instructed the 
Government to send a letter to all subpoena recipients five 
  But “[n]o right of a defendant is 
violated when a potential witness freely chooses not to talk; a 
witness may of his own free will refuse to be interviewed by 
either the prosecution or the defense.”  Kines, 669 F.2d at 9; 
see also United States ex rel. Trantino v. Hatrack, 408 F. 
Supp. 476, 481 (D.N.J. 1976) (“[W]hile it is true that a 
witness is not to be prevented from speaking to the defense by 
the prosecution, it is equally true that a witness cannot be 
required to speak to an investigator or attorney.  That matter 
rests . . . entirely with the witness.”).   
                                              
3 These witnesses were employees of UMDNJ, whose general 
counsel advised them not to speak with the defense.  Counsel 
stated that she instructed the employees not to speak with the 
defense for fear it would jeopardize the University’s deferred 
prosecution agreement.  In this context, we do not attribute to 
Government misconduct UMDNJ counsel’s advice to 
University employees.   
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months before the start of trial, stating that the witnesses had 
“an absolute right to speak to anyone . . . about anything 
[they] know about any of the matters under investigation, 
including the fact that [they] were subpoenaed and . . . 
testified before the grand jury.”4
 In these circumstances, we believe that Appellants 
have not shown that, because of the Government’s conduct, 
there was an “absence of . . . fairness [that] fatally infected 
the trial.”  Kines, 669 F.2d at 9 (quoting Lisenba v. 
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)); see also United States 
v. Terzado-Madrugo, 897 F.2d 1099, 1108-09 (11th Cir. 
1990) (concluding that letter advising witness that she was 
free to talk to defense cured or mitigated any harm from 
Government’s prior insinuation that witness would face legal 
consequences from speaking with defense); Diamante, 814 
F.2d at 70 (advising the Government to correct its error of 
instructing subpoenaed witnesses to keep their involvement in 
the grand jury secret by sending out letters notifying the 
witnesses that they have no legal obligation to do so).
  In particular, that letter 
confirmed that the Government “[would] not take any adverse 
action against [the witness] or [his or her] employer because 
[he or she chose] to speak to the defense or anyone else about 
these matters.”  
5
                                              
4 We agree with the District Court that the Government’s 
practice of placing its non-disclosure request on all grand jury 
subpoenas is “not a good policy” and discourage that practice 
in the future. 
  
 
5 Appellants claim that, in the time before the curative letter 
was sent, some witnesses’ memories faded before the defense 
could speak with them and others were too intimidated by the 
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Accordingly, we conclude that Appellants were not denied 
due process of law or the protections of Rule 6(e)(2)(A) and 
we decline to vacate their convictions for those reasons.6
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Honest Services 
Fraud and Bribery Counts 
  We 
now turn to the merits of Appellants’ remaining claims.  
 After trial, Bryant and Gallagher challenged the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support their honest services 
fraud and bribery convictions in a motion for a judgment of 
acquittal.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.7
We review a sufficiency of the evidence challenge de 
novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prosecution.  United States v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 60 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Appellants have a heavy burden to carry:  “[w]e will 
overturn a verdict only ‘if no reasonable juror could accept 
evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion of the 
  The District Court denied 
their motion, finding that the record supported the jury’s 
verdict.  On appeal, they again challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support their convictions.   
                                                                                                     
grand jury process to come forward.  They offer nothing to 
support these assertions and we shall not address their 
speculations.  
 
6  Nor do we believe that the District Court erred in declining 
to afford Appellants a hearing to demonstrate prejudice, and 
thus we do not remand the case for such a hearing now.    
 
7 Bryant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the pension fraud counts in the Rule 29 motion, 
which we consider below.  
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defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  United States 
v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting 
United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir. 1987)); 
see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-97 (1992) (same).  
We do not believe Appellants have met that burden. 
Our Court has defined the elements of traditional mail 
fraud as follows:  “To prove mail fraud, the government must 
establish (1) the defendant’s knowing and willful 
participation in a scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with the 
specific intent to defraud, and (3) the use of the mails . . .  in 
furtherance of the scheme.”  United States v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 
257, 279 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “[T]he term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes 
[one] to deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1346).  Bribery, “where a 
[public official] was paid for a particular decision or action,” 
is one type of honest services fraud.  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 263 (3d Cir. 2001)) 
(alterations in original).  The indictment in our case charged 
Appellants under a bribery theory of honest services fraud.8
The Supreme Court has explained that, as “[b]ribery 
requires intent ‘to influence’ an official act or ‘to be 
influenced’ in an official act . . . , there must be a quid pro 
quo—a specific intent to give or receive something of value in 
exchange for an official act.”  United States v. Sun-Diamond 
Growers, 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999) (emphasis in original).  
As the District Court instructed the jury, a quid pro quo may 
   
                                              
8 They were also charged under an additional theory 
involving failure to disclose a conflict of interest, but the 
District Court struck those allegations before trial.   
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come in the form of a “stream of benefits.”  Accordingly, to 
prove a quid pro quo  
the Government is not required to present 
evidence that attributes each official action to a 
corrupt payment.  It is enough for the 
[G]overnment to present evidence that shows a 
course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to 
a public official in exchange for a pattern of 
official actions favorable to the donor.  Thus, 
payments may be made with the intent to retain 
the official’s services on an “as needed” basis, 
so that whenever the opportunity presents itself 
the official will take specific action on the 
payor’s behalf.  The evidence of a quid pro quo 
can be implicit, that is, a conviction can occur if 
the Government shows that [the defendant] 
accepted payments or other consideration with 
the implied understanding that he would 
perform or not perform an act in his official 
capacity. 
United States v. Bryant, No. 3:07-cr-267, 2009 WL 1559796, 
*4 (D.N.J. 2009) (emphases added) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Kemp, 500 
F.3d 257, 281-82 (3d Cir. 2007) (endorsing “stream of 
benefits” theory of honest services fraud bribery); United 
States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 943 n.15 (9th Cir. 
2009) (same). 
Appellants argue that the Government did not prove 
that they entered into an unlawful quid pro quo arrangement.  
They claim that, although Bryant took official action while 
working at SOM, the Government failed to prove that he took 
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those actions because of his employment at SOM or that the 
Appellants had the requisite intent to enter into an illicit quid 
pro quo agreement.  However, based on the trial evidence, 
reasonable jurors could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Bryant and Gallagher had an agreement, even if implicit, 
that Bryant’s salary, bonus, and pension eligibility would be 
given in exchange for his official actions to increase state 
funding for SOM.    
The record evidence shows that in 2002 Gallagher was 
interested in improving SOM’s political clout and that Bryant 
wanted a pensionable job at UMDNJ.  At that time, Gallagher 
knew that SOM was in trouble, financially and otherwise.  It 
was historically underfunded relative to UMDNJ’s other 
schools, and in 2002 SOM’s academic budget was reduced by 
10%.  Because of the budget cut and decreasing revenues in 
general, SOM had difficulty paying staff salaries.  Also 
around that time the Governor appointed a commission to 
recommend medical education reforms.  That Commission 
suggested the consolidation of UMDNJ with Rutgers 
University and the New Jersey Institute of Technology.  The 
Government introduced evidence that Gallagher was 
disconcerted with this Commission report because, if such a 
merger occurred, he could lose his position as Dean of SOM.  
He expressed a desire to become more active in the “political 
arena” to ward off these proposed changes.  For his part, 
Bryant was keen to get a job at UMDNJ at that time.  As 
evidence of his interest, the Government elicited testimony 
from Stuart Cook, President of UMDNJ, that in 2002 Bryant 
approached Cook during a meeting and sought a part-time job 
at UMDNJ.  Cook later characterized this “request” as a 
“shakedown” given Bryant’s influence over budget decisions 
that affected the University. 
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Gallagher then created a new position at SOM with the 
title Program Support Coordinator.  According to the official 
job description, the Program Support Coordinator would 
report directly to Gallagher and would work three full days a 
week, making him a “.6” employee.  The official job 
description, which was approved by the Human Resources 
Department and posted for the public, listed the Program 
Support Coordinator’s responsibilities as improving SOM’s 
relations with local governments and community 
organizations; there was no reference to securing additional 
funding for SOM from the State government.  The salary was 
approved at $35,000, which was commensurate with the work 
of a .6 employee.   
There was evidence introduced at trial, however, that 
the interview process was a sham.  Only two candidates were 
actually interviewed (including Bryant), and Bryant’s 
interview was orchestrated only “to provide a paper trail.”  
Robert Prodoehl, Director of Operations at SOM and later 
Gallagher’s Chief of Staff, testified that, long before 
candidates were interviewed for the position, Gallagher had 
determined that Bryant would be hired for it.  Prodoehl also 
testified that, notwithstanding the official job description, 
Gallagher told him (Prodoehl) that Bryant would only work 
7.5 hours (one day) a week.  This should have qualified him 
as only a .2 employee.      
Six days after Bryant was hired, a meeting with 
Gallagher, Bryant, and John W. Crosbie, Director of Strategic 
Planning Program Development at SOM, was held to discuss 
how Bryant might advance SOM’s “supplemental funding 
strategy.”  Henceforth, procuring additional funding appears 
to have been Bryant’s principal activity.  The Government 
presented evidence that, during his employment at SOM 
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(about three years), Bryant orchestrated a $2.325 million 
carve-out of UMDNJ’s annual budget to be allocated to 
SOM’s base funding, an $800,000 appropriation for SOM’s 
Center for Child Support (a carve-out from the New Jersey 
Division of Youth and Family Services), and a $200,000 
grant to SOM’s Institute for Successful Aging (“ISA”).9
Appellants’ arguments to the contrary are not 
persuasive.  They claim that Bryant would have taken many 
of these official actions to “serve his constituents” even 
without the benefits from SOM.   However, the jury was not 
required to “find that the SOM salary was the sole impetus for 
Bryant’s actions.”  Bryant, 2009 WL 1559796, *7 (citing 
Kemp, 500 F.3d at 281-82).  Rather, “a conviction for honest 
services fraud may be sustained so long as there is sufficient 
evidence in the record for the jury to conclude that the public 
official intended to be influenced in exchange for a stream of 
corrupt payments.”  Id.  Here, based on the timing of Bryant’s 
official acts, a jury could infer that Bryant intended to accept 
a “stream of benefits” in the form of a salary and benefits 
from SOM in exchange for his official acts over the course of 
  
Notably, Bryant received a $5,000 bonus from SOM after the 
2003-2004 budget passed with the $2.325 million carve-out 
for SOM.  From this and other evidence, a reasonable jury 
could conclude that Gallagher offered Bryant his position at 
SOM in exchange for his official actions to procure additional 
State funding for the School and that Bryant then misused his 
power to that end.   
                                              
9 In a 2004-2005 budget program, individual New Jersey 
legislators could allocate discretionary grants to organizations 
of their choice.  Bryant controlled 10% of the grants, or $4 
million.  This was the source of the ISA grant. 
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his nearly three-year employment there.  That his actions may 
also have benefited his constituents is irrelevant.         
Appellants also argue that the Government failed to 
prove Gallagher’s mens rea—his intent that Bryant’s salary 
and benefits serve as a quid pro quo bribe.  They cite the 
Government’s lack of a smoking gun (i.e., that there was “no 
evidence of cash in a bag”), and assert that there is nothing 
wrong with Gallagher, as Dean, wanting his institution to 
flourish financially.  The Government may prove mens rea 
with circumstantial evidence, United States v. McKee, 506 
F.3d 225, 235 n.9 (3d Cir. 2007), and here the indirect proof 
of Gallagher’s intent was extensive:  for example, after the 
fraudulent job description surfaced, Gallagher made Crosbie 
create a false calendar to create the appearance that Bryant 
had done legitimate work at SOM.  Gallagher also lied to his 
supervisors about the nature of Bryant’s work, telling them 
that Bryant’s role involved “community relations” with no 
mention of his funding initiatives.  Based on that and other 
evidence discussed above, a reasonable jury could find that 
Gallagher had the requisite intent.   
Finally, we reject Appellants’ argument that the 
Government failed to prove the value of Bryant’s legitimate 
services to SOM, and thus did not prove that the salary and 
bonus in excess of the fair value of those services was a bribe.  
A jury could conclude from the evidence discussed above that 
Bryant did not work 22.5 hours per week, as required to 
qualify as a .6 employee with a $35,000 salary.  In any event, 
“[t]hat [Bryant] performed some . . . services did not prevent 
the jury from regarding the [salary and bonus] payments as 
primarily intended by [Gallagher] to secure [Bryant’s] 
legislative help.”  United States v. Urciuoli, 613 F.3d 11, 14 
(1st Cir. 2010) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 612 (2010) (addressing 
18 
 
argument that state senator provided some legitimate services 
in exchange for job at medical center in the context of honest 
services fraud conviction under a bribery theory).10
Because we believe that the Government presented 
substantial evidence of a quid pro quo bribery scheme to 
defraud the citizens of New Jersey of Bryant’s honest 
services, including circumstantial evidence of the requisite 
mens rea, we affirm the convictions on the honest services 
fraud and bribery counts.
  In sum, 
the evidence allowed a jury to conclude that Bryant’s salary 
and benefits—nominally for his public relations work—were 
in fact provided in exchange for his abuse of office.   
11
C.   Jury Instructions on the Honest Services Fraud and 
Bribery Counts 
 
 1.  Honest Services Fraud Jury Instructions 
                                              
10 Appellants cite evidence they submitted at trial, purporting 
to show that Bryant provided legitimate services to SOM.  
They “[were] free to make such arguments to the jury, but the 
jury could fairly reject them.”  Urciuoli, 613 F.3d at 15.  We 
presume the jury did so, as we review the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the Government.  Miller, 527 F.3d at 
60. 
 
11 Inasmuch as we believe the evidence was sufficient with 
respect to the quid pro quo alleged in the honest services 
fraud counts, we also conclude it was sufficient to support the 
bribery counts, as the bribery counts were based on the 
bribery alleged in the honest services fraud counts.   
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Appellants argue that the jury instructions for the 
honest services fraud counts were incorrect in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Skilling v. United States, 130 S. 
Ct. 2896 (2010), which limited the scope of honest services 
fraud to its historic “core.”  Specifically, the Skilling Court 
defined the “core” of honest services fraud to include only the 
types of bribery and kickback schemes that were criminalized 
in cases prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in McNally v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987).12
We review de novo whether a jury instruction stated 
the proper legal standard.  United States v. Flores, 454 F.3d 
149, 156 (3d Cir. 2010).  The Court instructed the jury on the 
honest services fraud counts as follows:    
  Appellants allege that 
the honest services fraud instructions were deficient because 
they did not require the jury to find an intent to “alter” an 
official action.  They contend further that the instructions’ use 
of the stream-of-benefits theory and dual purpose test (both 
discussed below) were legally incorrect after Skilling, as they 
claim both are outside the honest services fraud “core.”  We 
are not persuaded that Skilling had that effect on the law of 
honest services fraud, nor do we believe that the instructions 
failed to state the proper intent requirement.   
Counts 1 through 6 charge the defendants with 
committing honest services fraud by means of a 
quid pro quo bribery scheme.  Bribery requires 
a quid pro quo, that is, a specific intent to give 
                                              
12 McNally had struck down the notion of honest services 
fraud by limiting mail fraud to schemes involving tangible 
property rights, which, in turn, prompted Congress to enact 
18 U.S.C. § 1346, overruling McNally.   
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or receive something of value in exchange for 
one or more official acts. 
In order to find that a defendant engaged in quid 
pro quo bribery, you must find that the 
government proved each of the following 
beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to that 
defendant:   
First:  that R. Michael Gallagher gave, offered 
or promised something of value, particularly a 
stream of payments in the form of a salary and 
other financial benefits to Wayne Bryant; 
Second:  that Wayne Bryant was, at that time, a 
public official; 
Third:  that with respect to R. Michael 
Gallagher, he intended to give the stream of 
payments in the form of salary and other 
financial benefits in exchange for one or more 
official acts. 
That with respect to Wayne Bryant, he intended 
to perform one or more official acts in exchange 
for his salary and other financial benefits from 
[SOM.] 
A quid pro quo agreement may be implicit as 
well as explicit.  The improper benefit may 
consist of money and other financial benefits 
whether given on a one time basis or as a stream 
of payments to the public official.  In other 
words, when payments are accepted by a public 
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official from a payor with the intent to obtain 
that official’s actions on an “as needed” basis, 
so that when the opportunity presents itself that 
public official takes specific official action on 
the payor’s behalf in return for those payments, 
that constitutes a breach of the public official’s 
duty of honest service.  
You may find that the payor and/or the recipient 
has engaged in bribery even though the 
recipient could have lawfully engaged in the 
official conduct in question. 
Appellants’ first challenge to these instructions is that 
it did not require the jury to find that the payor (Gallagher) 
intended to “alter” the conduct of the public official (Bryant).  
They argue that the instruction suggested to the jury that 
honest services fraud included accepting payments for 
something a public official was already planning to do or had 
already done, which is a gratuity (or “reward”) and not a 
bribe, and thus not within the “core” of honest services.13
 Appellants are correct that “bribery requires a quid 
pro quo, which includes an intent to influence an official act 
  In 
short, they contend that the instructions did not make clear the 
specific exchange—that is, that Gallagher had to intend to 
influence Bryant’s actions and that Bryant had to intend to be 
influenced by the SOM salary and benefits.   
                                              
13 In Kemp we stated that a gratuity “may constitute merely a 
reward for some future act that the public official will take 
(and may already have determined to take), or for a past act 
that he has already taken.”  500 F.3d at 281 (quoting Sun-
Diamond, 526 U.S. at 405). 
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or to be influenced by an official act.”  Kemp, 500 F.3d at 281 
(construing federal bribery and gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 201, which is “equally applicable to bribery in the honest 
services fraud context”) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  It is also true that “bribery requires a specific 
intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for 
an official act.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  But they are 
incorrect that the instruction failed to state clearly those legal 
requirements.  
Yet Appellants ignore a key passage of the Court’s 
instructions, which stated: 
[N]ot every payment made to a public official 
constitutes a bribe.  A payment made in a 
general attempt to build goodwill or curry favor 
with a public official, without more, does not 
constitute a bribe. . . . What distinguishes a 
bribe from other payments that would not 
constitute violations is that a bribe is offered or 
accepted with the intent to influence, or to be 
influenced, in an official act. 
(emphasis added).  This instruction made clear that an intent 
to influence was required for a finding of guilt.14
                                              
14 Appellants concede in their Reply Brief, and we agree, that 
there is no meaningful difference between an intent to “alter,” 
and an intent to “influence,” official acts. 
  Despite 
Appellants’ suggestion otherwise, the Supreme Court has 
never required proof that the recipient actually perform the 
official act for which the bribe was taken (the quo).  See 
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 527 (1972); United 
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States v. Hood, 343 U.S. 148, 151 (1952).  Nothing in Skilling 
overrules this existing law.   
 Next, Appellants challenge the stream-of-benefits 
theory:  that a bribe may be given in the form of a series of 
benefits in exchange for official action on an “as needed” 
basis.  Appellants suggest that this theory is indistinguishable 
from the conflict-of-interest theory of honest services fraud, 
which was rejected in Skilling as outside the core of honest 
services fraud.15
 Nothing in Skilling, however, undermines the viability 
of the stream-of-benefits theory, which this Court first 
endorsed in Kemp, 500 F.3d 257.  See United States v. 
Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 352-53 (5th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 144-47 (2d Cir. 2007); Urciuoli, 613 
F.3d at 13-14 (confirming stream-of-benefits theory survived 
Skilling).  Indeed, Skilling did not eliminate from the 
definition of honest services fraud any particular type of 
bribery, but simply eliminated honest services fraud theories 
that go beyond bribery and kickbacks.  Appellants’ reliance 
on Skilling to undercut the stream-of-benefits theory is thus 
misplaced.   
   
 Finally, Appellants take issue with the dual purpose 
aspect of the jury instructions, that is, that the instructions 
                                              
15 The conflict-of-interest theory of honest services fraud 
criminalized undisclosed self-dealing by public officials 
whose actions furthered their own financial interests while 
purporting to act on behalf of the public.  Skilling, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2932 (citation omitted).  As noted, see supra note 8, the 
District Court in our case struck the charges that relied on a 
conflict-of-interest theory before trial began.  
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allowed for conviction on the honest services fraud counts 
even if the jury believed Gallagher was partially motivated to 
pay Bryant for some legitimate work as well as his official 
action.  Specifically, they object to the following portion of 
the instructions: 
You may find that any salary and other financial 
benefits accepted by Wayne Bryant was a bribe 
even if you also find it was paid, in part, for 
legitimate work if it was also paid, in part, in 
return for Wayne Bryant’s official action. 
The Appellants insinuate that this dual purpose test is 
similarly outside the core of honest services fraud.  Skilling 
did not so hold and we do not adopt that interpretation, as the 
consequences would be untenable.  On Appellants’ 
interpretation, a payor could bribe an official with impunity, 
intending to influence official action and vice versa, provided 
that the payor had some additional hope, however small, of 
receiving legitimate work in return.  We shall not stretch 
Skilling in this way.   
 2. Section 666 Bribery Jury Instructions 
 Appellants’ challenge to the bribery instruction is 
similarly strained.  They claim that these instructions were 
defective because they did not require an “exchange,” but 
merely a convergence in time of the quid and the quo.  To 
convict, the instructions required the jury to find as follows: 
[W]ith respect to Wayne Bryant, that Wayne 
Bryant corruptly accepted, agreed to accept, 
solicited, or demanded salary payments and 
other financial benefits from UMDNJ/SOM, the 
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quid; while intending to be influenced in taking 
favorable actions toward SOM in his capacity 
as a state legislator, the quo.   
With respect to R. Michael Gallagher, that R. 
Michael Gallagher corruptly gave, agreed to 
give, or offered salary payments and other 
financial benefits from UMDNJ/SOM, the quid; 
while intending to influence Wayne Bryant in 
taking favorable actions toward SOM in his 
capacity as a state legislator, the quo. 
(Emphases added.)  Appellants parse the language of these 
instructions to claim that the word “while” might have led the 
jury to believe that the Appellants were guilty so long as 
Gallagher intended to influence Bryant’s official actions “at 
the same time” as he was receiving his SOM salary and 
benefits, without having to conclude that the salary and 
benefits were provided “in exchange for” his official action.   
 Once more we fail to see the lack of an exchange 
requirement in these instructions.16  We do not think the word 
“while” materially changes the “intending to influence” 
language in the instructions.  Tracking closely to the language 
of the bribery statute,17
                                              
16 The Government argues that § 666 does not require proof 
of a quid pro quo in any event.  Because we believe that the 
instruction did require the jury to find an exchange, we need 
not decide that question today.   
 the “intending to influence” and 
 
17 Bribery occurs when a public official “corruptly solicits or 
demands . . ., or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value 
from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in 
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“intending to be influenced” phrases effectively link the quid 
and the quo.  This construction is not ambiguous (an 
identified quid must be given, with the intent of influence, in 
return for a quo) simply because the word “while” is used.  
Moreover, the Court’s prior instruction on the honest services 
fraud counts made clear that the jury had to find an exchange 
in order to find that there was a quid pro quo.18
                                                                                                     
connection with any business, transaction, or series of 
transactions of such organization, government, or agency . . . 
.” 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).   
   The jury was 
told to refer back to those earlier instructions for consistency 
and to consider all of the “instructions as a whole.”  In the 
final charge, the Court explained to the jury that “each part or 
phase of these instructions is to be considered and applied 
together with all the other parts and phases of the 
instructions.”  We assume that the jury followed their 
 
18 The instruction provided: 
In order to find that a defendant engaged in quid 
pro quo bribery, you must find that the 
government proved [that Gallagher] intended to 
give the stream of payments in the form of 
salary and other financial benefits in exchange 
for one or more official acts [and that ] Bryant 
.  . . intended to perform one or more official 
acts in exchange for his salary and other 
financial benefits from [SOM]. 
(Emphases added.)   
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instructions.19
*    *    *    *    * 
  United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155, 162 (3d 
Cir. 2009).   
Because we believe there was no defect in either the 
jury instruction for honest services fraud or bribery, we do not 
reverse Appellants’ convictions on that ground.     
D. Bryant’s Pension Fraud Counts  
 Bryant was charged and convicted of mail fraud in 
connection with a scheme to defraud the New Jersey Division 
of Pensions and Benefits (“the Pension Division”) by 
fraudulently seeking pension payments for his low-show job 
at SOM and his no-show job at the Social Services Board.  He 
argues that he should be acquitted of his conviction on those 
counts or, in the alternative, afforded a new trial because the 
evidence was insufficient and because the District Court 
abused its discretion in allowing a lay witness, Frederick 
Beaver, to testify about a legal issue.   
1. The Sufficiency of the Evidence on Pension 
Fraud 
As discussed above, we believe that substantial 
evidence supported the honest services fraud bribery 
                                              
19 For that reason, we also reject Appellants’ speculation that 
the jurors turned to the indictment, which lacked language of 
“exchange” in the § 666 charges, for clarification, as the 
Court instructed that they were only permitted to apply the 
law provided to them by the Court and that the indictment 
was an accusation and nothing more.   
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conviction in connection with Bryant’s SOM job; thus, we do 
not repeat that analysis here.  Accordingly, the only question 
remaining is whether the evidence taken in the light most 
favorable to the Government shows that Bryant fraudulently 
sought pension benefits for the services, if any, he rendered to 
the Social Services Board.20
As noted, the Government’s theory on the pension 
fraud counts was that Bryant submitted a fraudulent 
application for pension benefits—that is, he claimed himself 
eligible for benefits to which he knew he was not entitled 
from two public sector jobs (at SOM and the Social Services 
Board).  In New Jersey, the amount of a person’s pension is 
  We believe that it does.  
                                              
20  In its ruling on Appellants’ Rule 29 motion, the District 
Court noted “whether Bryant’s employment at SOM was 
unlawful does not necessarily satisfy the present inquiry [of 
whether the evidence is sufficient to support the pension fraud 
counts].  Whether or not the Division would have ultimately 
denied Bryant his pension if it knew the facts alleged in the 
Indictment is beside the point if Bryant took actions to make 
sure the Division would not know those facts.”  Bryant, 2009 
WL 1559796, *14 (quoting Bryant, 556 F. Supp. 2d at 434) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in 
original). “Rather, the jury could find that Bryant willfully 
engaged in mail fraud if the evidence demonstrated that 
Bryant concealed the nature of his actual employment at 
SOM and [the Social Services Board], i.e. his duties and the 
time he spent working on matters for SOM and [the Social 
Services Board].”  Id.  For the reasons stated above, we 
believe that a reasonable jury could find that Bryant 
concealed the nature of his employment at SOM as part of its 
overarching conclusion that the job was a bribe.   
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determined by a three-year average of his highest salaries 
across all of his qualifying, meaning public sector, jobs.  This 
is known as the “high three.”  At the time of Bryant’s 
application, he had accumulated pension-eligible salaries 
from four positions: as a State Senator, as a Program Support 
Coordinator at SOM, as a staff attorney for the Social 
Services Board, and as a lecturer at Rutgers University.  
Assuming pension credit from those jobs, Bryant selected a 
pension plan option that put his annual benefits at $81,268.  
However, without the SOM and the Social Services Board 
jobs qualifying, his benefits range would have been between 
$31,000 and $37,000.  Thus, the Government claimed at trial 
that because Bryant did little or no work at either SOM 
(because the job was a bribe) or the Social Services Board 
(because he never showed up to do the work himself), his 
pension application fraudulently inflated his eligibility for 
benefits.   
 The elements of traditional mail fraud, in which money 
or property is the object of the fraud, are:  (1) a scheme or 
artifice to defraud by means of a materially false or fraudulent 
pretense; (2) participation by the defendant with specific 
intent to defraud; and (3) use of the mail in furtherance of the 
scheme.  United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 590 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Bryant argues 
that the Government failed to prove the first two elements.   
 Bryant first claims that the Government did not prove 
that he made any false statements in his pension application.  
The evidence is otherwise.  In May 1996, Bryant was hired by 
the Social Services Board, a public and social services and 
welfare agency, as a part-time associate counsel and enrolled 
for pension benefits with the New Jersey Public Employee 
Retirement System (“PERS”).  He was hired as an individual, 
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salaried employee, which status made him eligible for those 
benefits.  His responsibilities included “attendance in court 
[and] representation of [children] in board, support matters, 
paternity establishments and related duties.”  However, 
shortly after Bryant began his employment at the Social 
Services Board, his supervisors began receiving complaints 
that he was not personally appearing in court on behalf of the 
agency, as he was sending other lawyers from his private law 
firm, Zeller and Bryant, to perform his work.  On initial 
discovery of Bryant’s delegation, his supervisor reminded 
him that he was required personally to perform the attorney 
work that he was hired to do.  Nevertheless, Bryant continued 
this practice for several years (from 2002-2006) and 
ultimately did little, if any, work for the Social Services 
Board.   Because neither Social Services Board members nor 
other agency supervisors attended the various court 
appearances, Bryant’s continued delegation of duties was not 
discovered.  Bryant did not train or supervise those to whom 
he delegated his work, but assigned even that oversight role to 
one of his law firm partners.   
 During this time, Bryant misrepresented to the Social 
Services Board that he was personally performing his work.  
The agency required all employees to submit written time 
sheets, on which the employee had to “[f]ill in the hours 
actually worked in each unit.”  Bryant claimed credit for the 
work he delegated:  on some he claimed as many as 22 hours 
every two weeks, and on many others he claimed over ten 
hours.  By signing those timesheets, he “submit[ed] that the 
above entries represent[ed] the hours [he] worked in the listed 
work units and the other compensable hours [he] used during 
th[ose] pay period[s].”  Bryant’s time records at his law firm 
belied those representations:  they showed that he worked no 
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hours for the Social Services Board in 2002, 10.3 hours in 
2003, 4.5 hours in 2004, and not at all in 2005 and 2006.   
In order to reap the benefit of this scheme, Bryant 
communicated with the Director of the Pension Division, 
Frederick Beaver, in January 2006 to determine the range of 
pension benefits for which he (Bryant) would be eligible on 
retirement.  In December 2006, he submitted his application 
for retirement benefits with plans to retire the next month.   
On those facts, we believe that Bryant’s application for 
pension benefits was a materially false or fraudulent pretense 
under § 1341.  We reject the legalistic argument that his 
application was not a false statement per se, but simply a 
request for benefits.  As we have said, “fraudulent 
representations, as the term is used in [section] 1341, may be 
effected by deceitful statements of half-truths or the 
concealment of material facts and the devising of a scheme 
for obtaining money or property by such statements or 
concealments.”  United States v. Olatunji, 872 F.2d 1161, 
1667 (3d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).  For that reason, we 
believe that the presentation of a benefits application that 
misrepresents an applicant’s eligibility is a false pretense that 
can serve as the basis of mail fraud liability.  Here, Bryant’s 
“request” for benefits concealed that he had delegated most of 
his work at the Social Service Board.  As such, we believe the 
application was a false pretense that was key to his scheme to 
defraud the Pension Division.   
Bryant next asserts that the Government did not prove 
his intent to defraud because he did not know that claiming 
benefits to which he was not entitled was illegal.  He claims a 
lack of notice because (1) there were no statutes or 
regulations that prohibited attorneys from claiming credit for 
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work that they had delegated, and (2) because the Pension 
Division was “well aware” of other lawyers who had done 
this and never attempted to revoke a pension for that reason 
prior to 2007 (when this case began).   
Neither claim is tenable.  There was no evidence at 
trial that it was commonplace for the Social Services Board 
attorneys who were enrolled in PERS to delegate work duties, 
or that the agency had de facto accepted such practices.  The 
Division Director (Beaver) testified that he was aware of only 
a few attorneys who had done so and that he had tried to put 
an end to it by reporting them to the Pension Board.  In 
addition, Beaver testified that prior to 2007 there was no 
specific statutory or regulatory prohibition against delegating 
work because “there was a presumption” by pension 
administrators “that the [employee] is doing the work.”  In 
sum, the unrebutted evidence showed that Bryant lied by 
claiming he was personally performing hours of work that he 
had delegated to others.  This behavior created an inference 
that he intended to defraud the Social Services Board in part 
so that he would be eligible for higher pension benefits.  See 
United States v. Bailey, 327 F.3d 1131, 1140 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(citing United States v. Prows, 118 F.3d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 
1997)) (intent to defraud may be inferred from evidence that 
defendant attempted to conceal activity).  
Finally, Bryant argues that there is a “convergence” 
problem with the evidence:  that is, that the party to whom the 
fraudulent pretenses were made (the Social Services Board) 
was not the same as the party from whom money or property 
would have been taken (the New Jersey pension system).  We 
have yet to decide this issue in the context of mail fraud.  
Compare United States v. Christopher, 142 F.3d 46, 54 (1st 
Cir. 1998) (“Turning to whether we should now adopt a 
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convergence theory, we see little reason to do so.  Nothing in 
the mail and wire fraud statutes requires that the party 
deprived of money or property be the same party who is 
actually deceived . . . .  We see no reason to read into the 
statute an invariable requirement that the person deceived be 
the same person deprived of the money or property by the 
fraud.”), with United States v. Keane, 678 F. Supp. 708, 711 
(N.D. Ill. 1987), aff’d, 852 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1998) (“to 
constitute fraud, the entity to be deceived must also be the 
entity that is to part with property”) (emphasis in original).   
However, we need not make that decision now, for 
Bryant’s fraud was not entirely “derivative” of the fraud on 
his employer, the Social Services Board, as he argues.  As we 
said above, his pension application was itself a materially 
false pretense, made to the Pension Division, that was part of 
his scheme to defraud the pension system.  Cf. Olatunji, 872 
F.2d at 1168 (concluding that an indictment may properly 
allege mail fraud where false statements are made to two 
different Government agencies even though the scheme is 
alleged to deprive property from only one, the “ultimate 
victim”).  Accordingly, we conclude that Bryant has not 
carried his heavy burden of prevailing on his insufficient 
evidence claim and affirm his convictions on the pension 
fraud counts.    
2. The Beaver Testimony 
 As discussed, the main issue at trial on the pension 
fraud counts was whether Bryant defrauded the Pension 
Division by claiming benefits to which he was not entitled.  
That issue turned in part on whether the work Bryant did for 
the Social Services Board qualified as a “creditable service” 
under New Jersey statute and regulation.  Only if Bryant’s 
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work was creditable service would he be eligible for pension 
benefits from the job.  This was related to the Government’s 
burden of showing that Bryant’s misstatements on his pension 
application were “material.”  To prove this, the Government 
wanted to show that Bryant’s representations that he had done 
the work himself were material to the Pension Division’s 
benefits-eligibility determination because in doing so he had 
effectively represented that his services were creditable.  To 
that end, the Government proposed testimony from the 
Director of the Pension Division, Beaver.21
The defense objected to the proposed testimony on the 
ground that testimony about creditable services was expert 
testimony on the law and Beaver was not such an expert.  
After a hearing on the admissibility of the proposed 
testimony, the Court allowed it limited to the issue of 
  He was to testify 
from his personal knowledge and experience at the Pension 
Division about, among other things, what is considered 
creditable service.   
                                              
21 Prior to trial, the District Court asked the Government to 
offer information about the “areas that would be explored 
with Mr. Beaver” so that it could decide whether his 
testimony would be lay or expert.  Prior to that, the 
Government had provided a letter disclosure to the defense 
stating that Beaver would testify “based on his personal 
experience and his knowledge of the state pension rules and 
practices derived from that experience.”  The Government 
anticipated that Beaver would testify, among other things, 
about “what constitutes honorable service and creditable 
service, circumstances under which an enrollee may not be 
entitled to benefits, [and] what information is important in 
granting and administering benefits.”  
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materiality:  whether it is material to the Pension Division’s 
benefits-eligibility determination that a person does not 
personally perform his work but rather delegates that work to 
others in his law firm.   
 Pursuant to that limitation, Beaver testified at trial that, 
based on his experience, repeatedly delegating work to others 
would not qualify as creditable service.  He stated that, for a 
service to be creditable, the person had to personally perform 
the work.  At certain points, however, Beaver spoke to the 
criteria for creditable service in reference to “statutory 
cite[s]” or “the statutory requirements of the administrative 
code.”  In one instance, he stated that, given certain statutory 
requirements, “we [the Pension Division] would look to 
creditable service [as] being any service that was delivered on 
behalf of the employer.”  At other times in the testimony, the 
Government asked Beaver whether he was familiar with 
various statutes and legal decisions.   
The defense objected that Beaver had offered improper 
legal testimony that exceeded the scope of what the Court had 
approved before trial, and moved for a mistrial.  The District 
Court denied the motion.  Later, two days before the jury was 
charged, the defense requested a limiting instruction 
regarding Beaver’s testimony.  The Court agreed and 
instructed the jury as follows:   
[Y]ou may only consider Frederick Beaver’s 
testimony as expressing his view and based on 
his experience as Director of the New Jersey 
Division of Pensions and Benefits . . . . 
Mr. Beaver is not an expert witness and may not 
opine on legal issues.  You must disregard any 
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of his testimony that touched on his 
interpretation of any legal issue[,] including the 
legal definition of creditable service. 
Mr. Beaver’s testimony regarding the 
importance of PERS members personally 
performing work was admitted for the limited 
purpose of showing materiality. . . . 
Bryant now argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion in allowing Beaver’s testimony in the first place 
and that the limiting instruction was insufficient to cure the 
prejudice of that improper testimony.  He asks us to order a 
judgment of acquittal or, in the alterative, a new trial.   
 A district court’s ruling admitting witness testimony is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion.  United States v. 
Stadtmauer, 620 F.3d 238, 260 (3d Cir. 2010).  The 
Government’s stated objective in offering Beaver’s testimony 
was to unravel for the jury whether Bryant’s false statements 
that he had personally performed his work were material to 
his benefits eligibility.  As a principal decisionmaker at the 
Pension Division, Beaver’s testimony on this point was 
important.  Indeed, at trial Bryant claimed that his 
misrepresentations were not material because the Social 
Services Board knew that some employees delegated their 
work and, by not stopping the practice sooner, had effectively 
condoned it.  Given the important and contested nature of this 
issue, we do not think that the District Court abused its 
discretion in allowing Beaver to testify about it as a fact 
witness.  To the extent that Beaver then testified on the law of 
creditable services (and not just on materiality), we believe 
that the Court’s limiting instruction was sufficient to cure any 
prejudice.   
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Moreover, Bryant did not object to the limiting 
instruction at trial, and so we review it for plain error.  United 
States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 2008); see also 
United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2162 (2010) 
(establishing plain error requires showing of “error”; that is 
“clear or obvious”; that “affect[s] the appellant’s substantial 
rights” insofar as it “affect[s] the outcome of the district court 
proceedings; and “the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings”).   
Bryant first contends that the instruction was given too 
late—26 days after Beaver’s testimony and two days before 
the final charge of instructions to the jury.  However, Bryant 
is in no position to complain about the timing of this 
instruction, as he did not request one until that time and the 
Court promptly complied.  In any event, we think that two 
days before the final charge is a reasonable time for a trial 
court to issue a limiting instruction to the jury.  In this 
context, Bryant has not shown that the District Court 
committed an error, let alone a plain one.    
 The remainder of Bryant’s complaints boil down to an 
argument that the jurors did not understand the instruction.  
He argues that they could not have understood the difference 
between materiality and “a legal issue” and that the 
distinction between the two is illusory in any event.   
Again, as noted, we generally presume that juries 
follow their instructions.  Lee, 573 F.3d at 162; see also 
United States v. Mende, 43 F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(same).  This includes an instruction to disregard certain 
evidence, “unless there is an overwhelming probability that 
the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and 
a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be 
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devastating to the defendant.”  Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 
766 n.8 (1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(motion to strike).   
In our case, the Court instructed the jury not to 
consider Beaver’s testimony to resolve any legal questions, 
but only for the purpose of deciding whether Bryant’s 
misrepresentations were material.  It then instructed on the 
definitions of materiality (the objective question on which the 
jury could consider Beaver’s testimony) and creditable 
service (the legal question on which the jury could consider 
only the Court’s charge).  At no time did the jury express 
confusion or ask for clarification on the difference between 
materiality and creditable service.  It is of no consequence 
that the Court gave the limiting instruction before it defined 
materiality and creditable service, as it had directed the jury at 
the outset of trial not to begin deliberations until it received 
all instructions on the law.  See United States v. Diaz, 597 
F.3d 56, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2010).   
With this backdrop, we do not believe that the jury 
failed to understand the limited purposes for which it could 
consider Beaver’s testimony.22
                                              
22 We note that Bryant overstates the importance of the legal 
question of whether he provided bona fide creditable service 
to the Social Services Board.  Lying about personally 
performing the work is what got him into trouble, not the fact 
that he had not actually rendered creditable service. As the 
District Court instructed, “the question before [the jury] is not 
whether the [Pension Division] would have approved Wayne 
Bryant’s application for pension benefits.  [The jury is] to 
decide only whether the government has proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Wayne Bryant intended to defraud the 
  Because we believe the 
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testimony was properly admitted in the first instance and that 
there was no error (and, in any event, no clear error) in the 
limiting instruction, we deny Bryant’s request for a judgment 
of acquittal or a new trial.23
E. The Restitution Order 
    
At sentencing, the Court ordered Appellants to repay 
the full amount of Bryant’s SOM salary and bonus 
($113,167) as restitution to UMDNJ pursuant to the 
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3663A.  Appellants argue that this order should be reversed 
because the UMDNJ was not a victim within the meaning of 
the statute and, therefore, an award of restitution is not proper 
under the MVRA.  They contend further that, even if it were, 
                                                                                                     
[Pension Division] of money and property by the use of the 
mails.”  Put another way, whether delegating work to others 
nonetheless could have qualified as creditable service is not 
what mattered at trial; what mattered for purposes of a mail 
fraud conviction was whether Bryant lied on his application 
by claiming he had done the work himself because that false 
pretense evidenced his intent to defraud the Pension Division.   
 
23 Bryant also argues that Beaver’s testimony was the only 
evidence that he submitted a false or fraudulent benefits 
application.  However, Beaver’s testimony about what factors 
are material to the Pension Division’s decisions regarding 
benefits eligibility is unrelated to whether Bryant submitted a 
fraudulent application.  Moreover, for the reasons stated 
above, there was ample other evidence that he did so.  As we 
conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting the testimony and that the curative instruction was 
not plainly erroneous, this argument fails.   
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the Court failed to offset the order by the fair value of the 
services Bryant provided to SOM.   Because we believe that 
UMDNJ is a proper victim under the statute, we conclude that 
restitution to that entity was appropriate.  Moreover, because 
Appellants did not carry their burden of proving the value of 
any offsets that might have been warranted, we also affirm 
the amount of restitution ordered.    
 We review de novo whether restitution is permitted by 
law and the amount of the award for abuse of discretion.  
United States v. Quillen, 335 F.3d 219, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(quoting United States v. Simmonds, 235 F.3d 826, 829 (3d 
Cir. 2000)).  The MVRA defines a victim as “a person” 
harmed  
as a result of the commission of an offense for 
which restitution may be ordered . . .[,]  
including, in the case of an offense that involves 
as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern 
of criminal activity, any person directly harmed 
by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the 
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2).  Noting the MVRA’s “expansive 
purpose,” other courts have interpreted “person” to include 
governmental entities, United States v. Ekanem, 383 F.3d 40, 
44 (2d Cir. 2004) (U.S. Government); see also United States 
v. Lincoln, 277 F.3d 1112, 114 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).  
Consistent with that purpose, we believe that the MVRA 
definition of victim includes public institutions that receive 
government funding, such as UMDNJ.     
 Appellants argue, however, that the “medical school” 
cannot be a victim within the meaning of the MVRA because 
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it knowingly participated in the scheme to hire Bryant in 
exchange for his official action and, in fact, benefitted 
financially from this scheme.   They claim that, because the 
school gained money from the scheme, the order of restitution 
does not compensate a victim for “actual losses” as required 
by the statute, but rather imposes a disgorgement penalty on 
Appellants consistent with a theory of unjust enrichment but 
not the MVRA.   
 Appellants blur the difference between UMDNJ and 
SOM by referring to “the medical school” generally.  
Contrary to their characterization, the indictment did not 
allege a scheme designed to benefit “the medical school,” but 
rather one to benefit SOM and its programs.  Specifically, the 
Government proved that the scheme carved out $2.325 
million from the UMDNJ budget for direct allocation to 
SOM.  In his position as Chairman of the Senate Budget 
Committee, Bryant insisted that this carve-out of UMDNJ’s 
annual allocation be added to SOM’s base funding and be 
similarly allocated in each subsequent year.  Never before had 
SOM received such a carve-out, and no evidence indicated 
that Bryant had ever advocated for SOM within the Budget 
Committee before going on SOM’s payroll.  Thus, UMDNJ 
suffered financially at the expense of the quid pro quo 
exchange.     
 We are not persuaded by Appellants’ claims that 
UMDNJ was not a victim because high-level employees at 
UMDNJ were knowing participants in the scheme.  Those 
assertions are contrary to evidence presented at trial and 
credited by the District Court at sentencing: in particular, that 
Gallagher kept his superiors at UMDNJ ignorant about his 
agreement with Bryant and never told anyone at UMDNJ that 
Bryant was not performing the work he was supposed to be 
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doing or that he was exercising his official power in favor of 
the institution.  We see no reason to disturb these conclusions, 
and thus reject that UMDNJ was in league with Bryant and 
Gallagher such that it was not a proper victim; it was a victim 
who suffered actual losses.  
 We also reject Appellants’ assertions that charging 
honest services fraud, which is fraud that results in a loss to 
the public of its right to the honest services of its public 
servants, is inconsistent with a theory of financial loss to a 
victim.  We fail to see how the intangible losses associated 
with honest services fraud preclude the possibility of actual 
financial losses to an identifiable victim as well.  Here, as 
noted above, the New Jersey public was deprived of Bryant’s 
honest services and UMDNJ was deprived of $2.325 million 
in funding.  The MVRA provides a remedy for the latter loss.  
Moreover, restoring the financial loss to UMDNJ also 
indirectly compensates the public for its loss of Bryant’s 
honest services.  UMDNJ, as a recipient of taxpayer funds, is 
a proxy for the State’s interests, including its citizens’ interest 
in the honest services of its public servants.  See United States 
v. Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2005) (ordering restitution 
to nonprofit organization by state senator who traded 
kickbacks for state contracts where the organization was a 
proper “proxy” for the victim, the United States and the 
federal interest in general).  Thus, we conclude that the order 
of restitution was lawful, and now consider Appellants’ 
challenge to the amount of the award.   
 The MVRA requires restitution be ordered for the “full 
amount” of each victim’s loss.  18 U.S.C. § 3663(f)(1)(A).  
“The proper amount of restitution is the amount wrongfully 
taken by the defendant.”  United States v. Sapoznik, 161 F.3d 
1117, 1121 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
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§ 3663A(b)(1)(B)).  As noted, Appellants argue that the 
District Court should have offset the restitution amount (the 
sum total of Bryant’s salary and bonuses from SOM) by the 
value of the legitimate services Bryant provided, as he was 
charged as having a low-show, not a no-show, job at SOM.   
 Under the MVRA, the Government has the burden of 
proving the amount of the victim’s loss, but the defendant has 
“[t]he burden of demonstrating such other matters as the court 
deems appropriate,” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).  In other cases 
where offsets are claimed, such as for compensation that the 
victim gets from other sources, other Courts of Appeals have 
concluded that it is the defendant’s burden to prove those 
offsets.  See United States v. Elson, 577 F.3d 713, 734 (6th 
Cir. 2009); United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358, 365 (5th 
Cir. 2001)  Likewise, with respect to an offset for services 
rendered, we believe that, because “[t]he restitution statute 
allocates the various burdens of proof among the parties who 
are best able to satisfy those burdens[,] . . .  the defendant 
should know the value of any [legitimate services] he has 
already provided to the victim[, and so] . . . the burden should 
fall on him to argue for a reduction in his restitution order.”  
Elson, 577 F.3d at 734 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Because it was Appellants’ burden to prove offsets 
for any legitimate services Bryant might have rendered, and 
they failed to do so at sentencing, we conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in ordering 
$113,167 in restitution.24
                                              
24 We note that in other circumstances the proper loss 
calculation may not equal the full amount of a corrupt 
employee’s salary and bonus, particularly in cases where the 
employer would have hired an “honest” public servant and 
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III. Conclusion 
We believe sufficient evidence supported each of the counts 
of conviction.  Moreover, we discern no defect in the jury 
instructions for honest services fraud or bribery.  We 
conclude also that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in regard to the Beaver testimony involving 
Bryant’s pension fraud counts.  Finally, we hold that the 
Court’s restitution order was proper.  We thus affirm in all 
respects.   
                                                                                                     
paid him or her the same amount.  In those cases, the loss 
may be “the difference in the value of the services that [the 
corrupt employee rendered] and the value of the services that 
an honest [employee] would have rendered.”  United States v. 
Sapoznik, 161 F.3d 1510 (10th Cir. 1995).  Here, however, 
the job at SOM was created to accommodate Bryant—a false 
job description was drafted and the subsequent hiring process 
was a sham predestined to result in hiring Bryant for the 
position.  Presumably, absent the quid pro quo, the position 
would not have been made and filled, and thus in this case the 
full amount of the salary and bonus is appropriately “pegged 
to the actual losses suffered by the victims of the defendant’s 
criminal conduct,” and “based upon losses directly resulting 
from such conduct.”  Quillen, 335 F.3d at 222 (emphases in 
original).    
